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Abstract- RFID technology has many potential applications that would ease object 
identification seamlessly. One of its potential benefits to government is the adoption of RFID 
tag as embedded smart material within vehicle license plate. However, adoption of RFID in 
vehicle license plate is fragile from various RFID attacks while efforts to improve its security 
will lead to additional cost. Enhancing RFID security without extra cost poses new challenges 
to researchers in the area. This study aims to provide a state of the art on RFID authentication 
protocols under low cost restriction as a foundation for decision maker for further 
development stage of RFID based vehicle license plate. In depth analysis is performed by 
assessing the protocols according to three features namely data protection, tracking 
prevention, and forward security. Finally, it is concluded that the protocols are vary in 
satisfying three aspects of security features. 
 
Index terms: RFID, vehicle plate license, smart identification, security and privacy, low 
cost, data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology to simplify automatic identification of 
objects with electromagnetic fields. In general, RFID tags can be divided into two categories, 
active and passive. Active tags require a power source, while passive ones do not rely on power 
source. This paper interests on passive tags because the tags do not require batteries and low 
production and maintenance cost. In addition, they also have an indefinite operational life and are 
small enough to fit into a practical adhesive label.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. RFID communication model 
 
Generally, RFID systems consist of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and RFID 
readers. While RF tags operate as transponders, RF readers act as transceivers. In case of a more 
complex application, a database server is required to store information comes from both 
transponders and receivers sides [1].  
The bandwidth for RFID communication systems is relatively low in several kBit per second. 
Although this is very small compared to other wireless technologies, recent modes offer higher 
data rates due to only small data is exchanged with a single tag. The bandwidth is more 
appropriate to perform scanning to all tags in the operation range of a reader within a short time 
[5]. 
Low cost RFID is attractive for wider implementation (replacing magnetic stripe cards and 
classical contact smartcards) in logistics, point-of-sale checkouts, animal identification, item 
management in libraries, and waste management [2]. In addition, more sophisticated RFID tags 
are used for higher value items in more complex applications such as ticketing, electronic purse, 
key, access control for various facilities, and even for human body [2,34].  
In this paper, author look at its potential application in vehicle management in developing 
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countries by embedding RFID tag within vehicle license plate. Hwang, et.al [33] describes 
various techniques used to design a prototype of RFID based vehicle license plate in 900 MHz 
band.  Through such innovation it is believed that government will have a better automatic public 
vehicles management while simplify road toll and it also may be used as anti-theft device for 
vehicles [31,32].  
The issue is low cost RFID tag difficult to provide strong security and privacy mechanism, while 
improving high level of security will lead to increasing of RFID cost. Leaving government in 
developing country to adopt low cost and unsecure RFID tag to deal will public vehicle 
management will eventually result in security and privacy issues in the future. 
Therefore, it is important to look at state of art on RFID authentication protocols that compromise 
security mechanisms in one hand and keeping low cost of RFID tag production on the other hand. 
This review provides foundation for academia, professionals and government policy makers to 
decide which protocol to be adopted in the future. 
In the second section, several RFID attacks and its characteristics are described. Section 3 serves 
as literature review for several RFID authentication protocols under low cost boundaries. In 
addition, in depth evaluation of the protocols based on three security and privacy perspectives 
namely data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security are given in section 4. 
Eventually, conclusions and future research direction are drawn in the last section. 
 
II. RFID ATTACKS 
 
Attacks on RFID technology has been a hot area of research. Inherently, RFID was designed with 
lack of security and privacy mechanism which eventually leads to different types of attack. This 
paper classifies these attacks according to the location where the attacks occur. In this regard, 
attacks location are categorized into air interface, reader, and systems. 
A. Attacks on the Interface  
RFID suffers from this kind of attack which occurs on the interface. Examples of this type are 
eavesdropping, jamming, relay and replay attacks. Eavesdropping  is considered as basic threats 
to RFID systems. In this case, eavesdroppers could impersonate a target tag without knowing the 
tag’s internal secrets. The eavesdropped information could for example be used to collect privacy 
sensitive information about a person [12][13]. 
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Jamming attack means a deliberate attempt to disturb the air interface between RFID reader and 
tag and thereby attacking the integrity or the availability of the communication. This could be 
achieved by powerful transmitters at a large distance, but also through more passive means such 
as shielding. As the air interface is not very robust, even simple passive measures can be very 
effective [14].   
A relay attack  [15] for contactless cards is similar to the well known man-in-the-middle attack. 
In this type of attack, attacker sits in the middle of two ways communications and receives data 
from with both the reader and the victim’s card. It is proven that this kind of attack also able to 
collect sensitive information of the RFID users.  
In contrast to relay attack, in replay attack an attacker reuses communications from previous 
sessions to perform a successful authentication between a tag and a server. If a valid RFID signal 
can be intercepted and the data is recorded, this data can later be retransmitted to the reader. 
Because the data appears valid, the system accepts it and therefore users’ information can be 
gained inappropriately. [16] 
 
B. Attacks on the Readers  
In contrast to previous type of attack, the main target of this kind of attack is the reader. It 
attempts to falsify reading processes. Physical attack is an example of this type. It is the most 
common and considered as the most traditional attack which may lead to denial of service attack 
if the RFID tags are removed or broken. Unauthorized person could remove tags or put in foil-
lined booster bag that will block RFID reader’s request and temporarily deactivate the tag.  
Another example of attack is falsifying reader ID. In a secure RFID system the reader must 
authenticate to the tag. Illegal reader may falsify reader ID by faking the “identity” of an 
authorized reader. In this case, an attacker able to read the data with his own reader, although 
such an attack can be "very easy" to "practically impossible" to carry out which is depending on 
the security measures in place.   
C. Attacks on the Systems  
In this category, attacks fall into three types, flooding attack, RFID exploit and RFID worm and 
virus. Flooding attack is performed against the database systems of RFID. If it is flooded with 
useless data then it will lead to denial of service attack. An attacker could attach RFID on other 
items causing RFID system to record useless data which will flood an RFID system with more 
Irfan Syamsuddin, STATE OF THE ART ON SECURE AND LOW COST 
 RFID AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS FOR RFID BASED VEHICLE LICENSE PLATE 
1952
data it can handle. 
RFID exploits are attack on RFID which is similar to software in general such as buffer 
overflows, code insertion and SQL injection. RFID worms and Viruses on the other hand is 
malicious code which is basically an RFID exploit that downloads and executes remote 
malwares. A worm could propagate through the network or through tags. Similarly, an RFID 
virus starts with malicious content of a tag. When the tag is read out, this initiates a malicious 
SQL query which may disturb the database in the back office. This type of attack already has 
been demonstrated. 
In order to deal with the attacks, researchers have put their best efforts to design and test RFID 
authentication protocols in various ways. In the case of developing country, since decision to 
embed RFID tag within vehicle license plate is significantly depend upon minimum cost of 
implementation, finding appropriate security solution under low cost circumstances is essential 
for decision makers.  
 
III. LOW COST RFID AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
 
Increasing RFID security and privacy threats in the past decade have resulted in tremendous 
number of authentication protocols. However, increasing security and privacy mechanisms 
usually leads to increase of RFID tag cost. This is considered as a very challenging task where 
the protocol should provides strong RFID authentication mechanism within the low cost 
limitation. Low cost RFID tags are very limited devices with very constrained (less than 1K logic 
gates to security related tasks) computationally. 
In current literature [35], there are nine protocols that strictly consider low cost boundaries while 
offering robust security and privacy mechanism in various ways. They are One Time Password 
introduced by Juels, et.al [2] with a simple XOR operation. External Re-Encryption as proposed 
in [4] which utilize simple public key cryptosystem, Hash-based Authentication developed by 
Ohkubo et al. [7], Blocker Tag as a simple RFID tag blocking mechanism offered in [3], 
Extended Hash-lock by Weis et al. [8], Hash-based Varying Identifier as another protocol with 
hash function proposed in [5], Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier as proposed in [9] which 
focus on preventing “man in the middle” attack under low cost RFID circumstances, Mutual 
Authentication protocols as presented in [10,11,28], Ultra Lightweight  method which was 
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introduced by Peris-Lopez . [24,26,27]. 
In depth discussion and analysis the protocols mentioned above are provided in the following 
sections. 
   
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, assessment of the low cost authentication protocols will be based on three main 
security and privacy features namely data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security.  
The term of data protection refer to ability to maintain data confidentiality and privacy of tag 
bearers. While tracking prevention refers to protection capability of location privacy of tag 
bearers, and forward security means ability to preserve history even after the secrets or keys have 
been exposed.  
 
A. One-time Pad based on XOR 
This method was proposed by Juels [2]. It requires a very simple XOR operation, therefore low 
computational cost for RFID is satisfied. A reader (or a back-end server) has the common list of 
randomly generated key for each tag. The reader and the tag find that both of them have the same 
key of the key list with several message exchanges between them. Then, the tag transmits its ID 
to the reader. However, this method needs several message exchanges for authentication between 
the tag and the reader. Besides, the common key list must be refreshed to guarantee the security. 
Although it seems provide appropriate tracking protection, it could not satisfy data privacy 
protection. Another limitation is that the protocol does not provide forward security. These are 
problems for implementation and system efficiency. 
Illustration of passive attacks on XOR based RFID protocol is presented in [36]. 
If n1, n2 mod 96 = 0  
Then  
MixBits(0 mod 96,0 mod 96)=0 mod 96  
C = ROT ((ROT (n3+ K1*+π+n1', n3)+K2*⊕ n1', n2) ⊕ n1‘  
In case that n1, n2, n3, n1’ mod 96 all become ZEROs  
Hence  
C = K1* + π + K2*  
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K1*+K2*=C-π  
Similarly  
D = ROT((ROT(n2+K2*+ ID+n1', n2) +K1* +n1', n3) +n1'  
 = K1*+ID+K2*  
Then  K1* + K2* = D - ID  
IDS
next
 =ROT ((ROT (n1'+K1*+IDS+n2',n1')+K2* ⊕ n2', n3) ⊕ n2'  
 = K1* + IDS + K2*  
 K1* + K2* = IDS
next
 - IDS  
As a result  ID = D – C + π 
Also            ID = D - IDS
next
 + IDS  
And             C-π = IDSnext - IDS  
While observing the external exchanged public messages, if two successive authentication 
sessions satisfy final equation, then the secret value of ID is compromised and will be easily 
obtained by attacker [36].  
 
B. External Re-Encryption Scheme 
External Re-Encryption Scheme was proposed in [14].   This method is aimed at protecting RFID 
security  by using public key cryptosystem. This scheme is considered as a low cost protocol 
since it only utilizes two main mechanisms to authenticate RFID communications. 
First, tag data is re-encrypted when a user requires using the data transferred from an external 
unit. As public key encryption needs high computation cost, a tag cannot process for itself. Thus, 
this job is generally processed by a reader.  
Second, each tag data is randomly shown until next session, the attacker eavesdrop the tag data 
cannot trace the tag for long-term period therefore, data privacy protection is guaranteed.  B 
However, this method has limitations to frequently refresh each tag's data since the encrypted ID 
stored on tag is constant so that user location privacy is compromised. Therefore, it does not fully 
protect users’ privacy. In addition, forward security is not covered by this protocol. 
 
C. Hash Chain-based Scheme 
Ohkubo et al. [7] proposed a hash-based authentication protocol. The aim of the protocol is to 
provide better protection of user privacy with the basic concept of refreshing the identifier of the 
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tag each time it is queried by a reader. The protocol changes RFID identities on each read based 
on hash chains. Hash chain method is used in this two ways communication of RFID tag. This 
work was adopted in [30] by enhancing unilateral randomly authentication protocol using one-
way hash function. Even though the protocol does not require a random number generator, it 
seems satisfy data protection of RFID tags as well as provides adequate tracking prevention. 
However, this protocol is flawed to certain replay attacks which makes it difficult to guarantee 
forward security.  
 
D. Blocker Tag 
This protocol was introduced by Juels, et.al. [3]. The approach uses an individual tag, namely 
blocker tag for each tag and according to its purpose. To protect a tag's data, the blocker tag 
responses for attacker's request to get the tag's data. The response from the blocker tag is not for 
the tag but all tags. Thus, the attacker cannot distinguish the tag's data. This method basically 
uses binary tree walking protocol as a collision-avoidance mechanism as can be seen in figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Concept of binary tree walking 
 
Using the binary tree-based protocol, this method has advantages that the range of protecting tags 
can be efficiently specified into specific area of the binary tree [3]. Doing so, the area of 
protecting tags is divided into multiple privacy zones and the performance of tree walking can be 
efficient. This method also provides zone policy to apply protection policy according to various 
purposes. This method is currently considered as a practical solution for the existing RFID 
privacy and security protection by adequately maintain tracking prevention and forward security. 
Problem is that additional blocker tag is needed for every tag and it is susceptible whether tag 
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bearers strictly follow to attach the additional tag which could pose user privacy. 
 
E. Extended Hash-lock Scheme 
The next RFID protocol with low cost constraint is called Extended Hash-lock. It is an 
authentication scheme introduced by Weis [8] in 2003. It was actually developed in two types, 
namely hash-lock and extended hash-lock schemes. However, the last name is widely used to 
identify this unique protocol. Both protocols employed different ways of hash functions. 
As can be seen in figure 3, hash-lock scheme uses a back-end server to store keys k in its 
database for all tags. Each tag unique key with metaID = h(k) as its key. The tag transmits 
metaID as a response to a reader’s query to the tag. Unfortunately, this protocol fails to overcome 
eavesdrop attacks since metaID is always constant which opens tracing problem. Therefore, 
location privacy of tag bearers is compromised. 
 
 
Figure 3: Hash-lock Scheme 
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Figure 4. Extended Hash-lock Scheme 
 
On the other hand, extended hash lock protocol [8] provides a unique method to overcome the 
tracing problem. Figure 4 shows what they called as extended hash-lock scheme. In this scheme, 
they introduced a tag with random number generator to randomize metaID value. The tag picks 
pseudo random number r uniformly and calculates c=hash(IDjjr) as the tag's unique 
identification for every session. The tag transmits its c and r to a back-end server by way of the 
reader. The server sends the unique identifier of the tag comparing c with the construction of r 
and all IDs that is stored in database of the server, then the server authenticates itself by sending 
the unique identifier, ID back to the tag. 
Although this scheme provides strong authentication and prevents from the replay attacks, the tag 
can be traced if the tag's ID is exposed. In addition, an adversary can query a tag to get a tag's 
valid message pair (c; r). Later on, the attacker can impersonate that tag to a legitimate reader. As 
a result, the protocol could not fully satisfy data protection and forward security issues.  
 
F. Hash-based Varying Identifier 
Another hash-based approach is hash-based varying identifier proposed by Henrici and Muller 
[5]. Their scheme also adopts a hash function and a random number generator, but a pseudo 
random number is generated by a back-end server and transmitted to the tag for every 
interrogation to make the tag's queried identifier random and preserve location privacy. 
They assume that the communication channel between tags and readers is insecure, while the 
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communication channel between readers and back-end databases is secure. A tag has only a 
unique identifier and remaining original data used for applications stored and controlled in a 
back-end database. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Hash-based Varying Identifier 
 
Figure 5 shows the overall system architecture of this protocol is quite similar to that of other 
previous works. In server side, DataBase-ID is exist and is set according to the database which 
will be in charge of the tag and ID, TID and LST of a tag. These are set to a random value 
initially. A corresponding row in the database ID, TID and LST is similar to the tag. Then HID is 
set to h(ID) and is used as a primary index. The database manages a pair of record to guarantee 
message recovery for any data loss using AE fields which pointing each other. 
This protocol basically focuses on securing location privacy problems by making a tag's ID 
randomized in every interrogation. However, location privacy of tag bearers is compromised 
since the response of tag is constant until the next authentication session. Therefore, attackers 
able to track tag bearers whose tags are long-distance from readers and scarcely have chance to 
be queried. 
Yet, by employing TIDs, the replay attacks cannot compromise the scheme since tags and back-
end servers are mutually authenticated in every single interrogation. Errors in message transfer 
can be detected and the scheme is reliable for data loss since it can provide the data from the 
previous record. In short, forward security is not well provided.  
 
 
 
 
B. Server 
(RNG) 
 
 
 
 
Reader 
 
 
 
Tag 
1. Query 
3. h(ID),h(TID ID), TID 
4. R,h(R  TID ID)  
Secure Channel Insecure Channel 
HID,ID,TID,LST,AE,DATA ID,TID,LST 
2. h(ID),h(TID ID), TID 
5. R,h(R  TID ID)  
HID,ID,TID,LST,AE,DATA ID,TID,LST 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 6, NO. 5, DECEMBER 2013 
1959
G. Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier 
Hwang et al. [9] proposed an improved authentication protocol of hash-based varying identifier. 
The main difference between this protocol and the previous ones is that a reader utilizes what is 
called a random number generator (RNG) to protect the man-in-the-middle attack.  
 
 
Figure 6: Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier 
 
The above graph shows the overall protocol of Improved Hash-based Varying Identifier. In every 
query, the reader sends a pseudo-random number, S, to the tag. Then the tag replies h(ID) for 
finding the record of a back-end server and half of a new identifier, halfL(R) (R = h(ID||S). Then, 
the reader forwards h(ID), halfL(R), and S. At the back-end server, h(ID) is used to find the 
corresponding record and ID is obtained for authentication process. With stored ID and S 
received from the reader, the back-end server can calculate R’ = ID||S and also the tag can be 
authenticated by comparing halfL(R’) with the value of halfL(R) from the tag.  
If the authentication is successful, then the remaining job is updating ID of the record to a new ID 
= R’ and h(ID) to h(R0), and then updating AE fields of the pair of record to reference each 
other. Then, the back-end server replies halfL(R) with tag  
data to the tag by way of the reader. With halfR(R), the tag can check whether the reply message 
is valid or not. If the process is successful, the tag and the back-end database updates its ID  ID 
 (R||R) since they assume the hash function of this protocol is h : {0; 1}*  {0; 1}0.5L and R 
generated by this hash function is 0.5L bits. 
Unlike previous protocols, this one changes the location of a R.N.G. from a back-end server to a 
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reader as a new model. As a result, this scheme needs only 1l-field for a unique ID and its 
challenge and response phase uses a half length of R (R = h(ID||S)) so that its communication 
performance is more efficient than [7]. The scheme protects the location privacy as a tag's unique 
identifier is changed in every read attempts. The replay attacks cannot compromise the scheme 
since tags and back-end servers are mutually authenticated. 
However, this scheme is still vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack particularly if there is no 
guarantee that the reader is a trusted party. In short, although the protocol is claimed appropriate 
to protect traceability of user privacy, the protocol is still suffered from such attacks due to the ID 
of the tag remains constant until the next authentication session. During this limited period, 
adversaries can track tag bearers whose tags are long-distance from readers and scarcely have 
chance to be queried. 
 
H. Mutual Authentication 
In [10] Han et al. proposed a new mutual authentication protocol for RFID tags. The RFID reader 
and tag carry out the authentication based on their synchronized secret information. The 
synchronized secret information is monitored by a component of the database server. Although, 
this protocol is claimed satisfies the low-cost requirement of RFID tags, it’s highly dependable 
on back-end database is confirmed as a serious limitation [11]. 
Highly dependent on database server is criticized in [28]. In reality, connection between the 
RFID reader and the central database do not always available thus fully relying on a central 
database means creating a single point of failure, opening up the entire RFID system to denial of 
service attacks [28].  
In addition, two types RFID mutual authentication protocols both without database server was 
proposed. The first protocol performs challenge and response before sending the tag secret to the 
reader, whilst in the second version the tag secret is sent in such a way that only an authenticated 
reader can decrypt it. 
This work was then improved in [11] which enable the removal of reliable consistent connections 
between RFID readers with their database server without the timestamps as can be seen from 
figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Mutual authentication without database 
 
The protocol enables not only RFID tag to authenticate RFID reader but also the latter to 
authenticate RFID tag. It is confirmed that the protocol satisfy the requirement of both data 
protection and tracking prevention [11]. However, we found that it does not fully guarantee 
forward security.  
 
I. Ultra Lightweight  
While various hash formulas are usually applied to increase RFID security, ultra-lightweight 
security proposed by Lopez et.al [24],[26],[27] maintain security and privacy of RFID using 
simple operation. They introduced three protocols namely, Lightweight Mutual Authentication 
Protocol (LMAP) [24] and Minimalist Mutual-Authentication Protocol (M2AP) [26] and 
Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol (EMAP) [27]. Instead of using advanced hash formula, 
they use XOR, OR, AND, mod 2m.. In general, the protocols use a 480 EEPROM and a 96-bit 
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key divided into 4 parts updates after each message cycle. Preventing users from privacy location 
tracking and re-transmission attacks is the key feature of the protocols [24],[26],[27].  
 
 
 
Figure 8. LMAP Scheme 
 
LMAP protocol uses only 300 gates to provide security (see figure 8), the 96 bit key is divided 
into 4, which produce 4 messages, by which the reader sends A, B, C messages to the tag. To 
provide authentication, the tag replies with a D message, in accordance with messages A, B, and 
C [24]. However, there are risks of data forgery and fabrication during transfer [28]. If the final 
session is concluded irregularly, then the IDS and key values are not refreshed. This will expose 
identical values by which location tracking is possibly occurs. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. M2AP Scheme 
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 Similar to LMAP, M2AP protocol also employs 300 gates. As shown in figure 9, the only 
difference is that in this protocol there is an additional E value to add more security in database 
authentication compare to LMAP method [26]. Though it is efficient in that it uses some 
calculations for authentication, [28] confirm that it fails to provide strong integrity since it does 
not use hash formulas or encryption algorithms. Therefore, there is a possibility to track user 
location when the final session is concluded irregularly and also the IDS and key values are not 
refreshed. 
The last protocol is called Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol or EMAP. This method is 
considered as the most efficient method among ultra-lightweight protocols, since it only uses 150 
gates to provide security of RFID [27]. In his method, the 4 keys, which have been divided from 
message E, produce the XOR algorithm sigma value (K1K2K3K4) by which provide a more 
accurate way of authentication. The 96 bit ID can be divided into two, resulting in the use of a 
1~48 bit ID and a 49~96 bit ID, which results in the use of 2 identification values. By inputting 
the key value into the formula, the safety of the system is enhanced. This method is more 
effective than the two previously mentioned systems, and can provide security within close 
ranges. However, it can be exposed to 3rd party tapping, message fabrication, or forgery over 
long ranges [28]. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. EMAP Scheme 
 
Although the method is quite unique and fit to low cost limitation, the three protocols also 
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criticized in terms of several weaknesses. As confirmed by Li et.al [29] who reveal these 
weaknesses by arguing that the protocols are not robust since there is no guarantee that the tag 
really recognize whether the replying messages are indeed received and verified by a legitimate 
reader or not.  
As illustrated in [29], bit de-synchronization attack is a kind of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
applied to change message C in EMAP. The attack firstly performs eavesdrop on the protocol 
message exchange to obtain A||B||C. It then changes A||B||C to become A||B||C’ , where C’0= 
C I0  and I0 =(000 … 001)
3
. Similarly, the attacker changes the reply D and E from the tag to D’ 
and E’, respectively.  
 
Figure 11. Attack on EMAP 
 
By applying it on EMAP, the attack has an average 75% success rate for E’ being accepted, no 
matter what the values of IDS
(n)
tag(i), n1 and n2 are. However, since IDS
(n)
tag(i) is known, if 
[IDS
(n)
tag(i)]0= 0, the attack succeeds with 100% rate and if if [IDS
(n)
tag(i)]0= 1, the success rate is 
only 50%. The following table depicts the final results. 
 
Table 1: Results of bit de-synchronization attack  
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As can be seen above, the tag might still accept compute the reply message based on the modified 
values in the received message. If this message is accepted by the reader, then the mutual 
authentication exist which mean both the reader and the tag will update their secrets to the 
attacker.  
Likewise, they also proof how vulnerable these protocols from full Disclosure attacks. The attack 
is done by repeatedly running the incomplete protocol many times at the tag side. This action will 
make the tag expecting that a completion message from the reader to update its secret. If the 
attacker can discharge the tag in a brute force way immediately after it sends out the reply 
message, all the secret information in the tag can be extracted [29]. As a result, ultra lightweight 
protocols also do not provide full protection for forward security and location tracking.  
After presenting advantages and disadvantages of all low cost RFID authentication protocols 
above, the author conclude the analysis in the following table [35]. 
 
Table 2: Summary of the analysis 
Protocols Tracking Protection Data Privacy Forward Security 
A    
B    
C    
D    
E    
F    
G    
H    
I    
 
Notation : 
 : Satisfied         : Partially Satisfied     
  :Not Satisfied      : Not Available 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This work is a preliminary study attempts to provide adequate survey on low cost RFID 
authentication protocols that would be useful for government decision makers particularly in 
developing country (in this case Indonesia) with respect to planning of adopting secure and low 
cost RFID based vehicle license plate.  
Nine types of RFID authentication protocols satisfy low cost requirement as mentioned in 
literature. Then each of them assessed according to tracking prevention, data protection, and 
forward security as main security and privacy issues for RFID. 
From tracking prevention perspective, it is concluded that some of protocols  (A,C,D, E, G, H) 
offer solution for tag anonymity using different kind of cryptographic approaches such as hash, 
hash-chain, or random number generator, and ultra-lightweight, while the rest (B, F, I) apply 
simple techniques based on some characteristics of RFID interfaces such as RFID tag's command 
or tag singularization that only partially satisfy tracking prevention requirements. In terms of data 
protection, only three protocols (A, D, E) could not fully satisfy this aspect, while the rest (B, C, 
F, G, H, I)   provide better data privacy protection. From the view point of the last feature of 
forward security, only single protocol (D) seems to satisfy this aspect, three other protocols (E, 
H, I)  could not fully satisfy it while the rest protocols (A, B, C, F, G) are fail.  
In short, it is clearly seen that each low cost protocol has different security characteristics and no 
single protocol offers full security features. In the future, findings derived from this study will 
serve as the basis for government policy maker to select the right low cost RFID authentication 
protocols for RFID license plate under multi criteria decision analysis (MCDA) environment.  
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